Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Recursive Preferences by An, Sungbae
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
5-2010
Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with
Recursive Preferences
Sungbae An
Singapore Management University, sungbae@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, and the Finance Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
An, Sungbae. Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Recursive Preferences. (2010). Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1259
Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model
with Recursive Preferences
Sungbae An∗
Abstract
This paper provides a simple and elegance approach for an empirical in-
vestigation of a model with Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences. The perturba-
tion method implemented in Dynare is readily applicable for computation
of equilibrium and welfare. A stylized new Keynesian economy with sticky
prices is analyzed and optimal simple rules are accessed across various types
of monetary policy rules.
Keywords: Recursive preference, perturbation method, Dynare, Ramsey
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1 Introduction
The recursive preferences have long been considered to provide a possible linkage
between the aggregate macro data and the financial market data. With an extra
degree of freedom that comes from the disentanglement between the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution (EIS) and relative risk aversion, we can tackle various
puzzles regarding financial data such as risk premium and risk-free rate puzzles,
at least in principle. The main reason that the recursive utility specification has
not been popular in the literature is the computational cost. The linearization
method generates exactly the same results with the time and event separable ex-
pected utility specification, a` la von-Neumann and Morgenstern. Recently, many
solution methods for empirical investigation of the recursive type utility are sug-
gested and applied. Tallarini (2000) is among the first authors who applies the
risk-sensitivity theory to compute an equilibrium asset pricing model under the
unit EIS. Croce (2008) also uses the same approach in a model with investment
adjustment cost based on Jermann (1998). Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008) uses
the Taylor approximation on the parameter around the unit EIS to investigate the
effect of the longrun risk in the consumption growth. Amisano and Tristani (2009)
uses perturbation method in studying the term structure model with this utility
specification. Papers by Caldara, Ferna´ndez-villaverde, Rubio-Ramı´rez, and Yao
(2009) and Aldrich and Kung (2009) compares the performance of the approxi-
mation methods including the projection and the perturbation approach. Even
though the high volatility of the shock can generate sizeable approximation error
in a perturbation approach, they show that the second order perturbation works
well especially the EIS is bigger than the unity as in Bansal and Yaron (2004).
In this paper we provide a simple way to use the perturbation method for mod-
els with recursive preferences. This approach is particularly interesting because
it is readily code-able in Dynare without any complications. The main idea for
this implementation is just to map the continuation value in the recursive utility
as another time-information consistent variable. Since the utility is already spec-
ified in a recursive form, the dynamic programming, the solution via the Bellman
equation so to speak, is directly applicable for agent’s optimization problem, and
moreover, the welfare calculation is intuitively simple.
For an empirical application, we consider a new Keynesian economy that fea-
tures the sticky prices via Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) pricing apparatus. In the
literature, this model is usually linearized around the zero-inflation steady state
when the model is not equipped with the price indexation. Following Schmitt-
1
Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), we use the second-order approximation via perturbation
method to analyze the welfare implication of various monetary policy rules around
the nonstochastic Ramsey steady state.
The main findings of the paper are two-fold. First, the computational cost
regarding the model with recursive preferences turns out to be small when we
use the perturbation method to approximate the policy function. We can even
introduce the recursive preference specifications to the medium scale workhorse
models such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007). It would be particularly interesting because larger models can contain the
financial sector where the recursive preferences can play a great role.
Secondly, the optimal simple rule in an economy with recursive preferences
almost attains the welfare level that the Ramsey steady state provides. Moreover,
the welfare implications are quite different whether the optimal simple rule or the
Taylor rule are exercised.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model
economy that consists of the representative household with recursive preference
and the firms who are subject to Calvo-Yun type pricing reoptimization chances.
Section 3 explains the solution method to implement the model equilibrium in the
Dynare and the welfare evaluation with recursive preferences. Section 4 describes
the calibration and the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model is a version of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) with augmentation with
recursive preferences. The model economy consists of the representative house-
hold, the final good producing firm, the monopolistically competitive intermediate
good producing firms, and the consolidated government who exercises the fiscal
and the monetary policy.
2.1 Household
The representative household has the Epstein-Zin type recursive preference, that
is, the household maximized the following utility by choosing consumption ct and
provides ht hours of work in a competitive labor market.
vt = max
{
(1− β)
(
ct(1− nt)ν
) 1−γ
1+ν
+ β
(
Et
[
v1−χt+1
] ) 1−γ1−χ} 11−γ
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where γ denotes the inverse of the EIS, χ governs the risk aversion, and ν controls
the labor supply. For the notational clarification, we rewrite the above preference
specification as
vt = max
{
(1− β)u1−γt + βW1−γt
} 1
1−γ
(1)
with the instantaneous utility ut and the continuation value Wt:
ut = c
1
1+ν
t (1− ht)
ν
1+ν , (2)
Wt =
(
Et
[
v1−χt+1
]) 11−χ
(3)
Hence, the representative household maximizes her lifetime utility that is char-
acterized as a CES aggregate of the current utility and the continuation value
weighted by (1− β) and β, respectively. We note that the continuation value Wt
is again a CES aggregate of the future welfare across the state of the world that
is governed by a stochastic process. As a special case when γ = χ, the above pref-
erence specification boils down to the von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility
that is additively separable both in time and state.
Assuming that households have access to a complete asset market and also
own capital for renting to firms, the utility maximization is subject to household’s
budget constraint and the capital evolution. The budget constraint is given as
ct + it + Et
[
Qt,t+1
Dt+1
Pt
]
+
Mt +Bt
Pt
≤ wtht + rKt kt−1 +
Dt
Pt
+
Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
+
Πt
Pt
− Tt
Pt
(4)
where it denotes the investment, Pt denotes the price of consumption and invest-
ment goods, Dt denotes the random nominal payment from holding risky asset,
Qt,t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs, Mt denotes nom-
inal money holding, Bt denotes the riskless government issued nominal bond that
pays the gross returnRt, wt denotes the real wage, r
K
t denotes the real rental rate of
capital, Πt denotes profits received from the ownership of the (intermediate goods
producing) firms, and Tt denotes the lump-sum tax paid to the government. The
household-owned capital is depreciated at a constant rate δ:
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + it. (5)
The household’s decision problem is (1) subject to (4) and (5). Let λt be the
Lagrange multiplier for (4) with substitution of (5). Since the lifetime utility is
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already given in a recursive form, the programming problem is a straight applica-
tion of Bellman equation solution. From the first order conditions we can write
the stochastic discount factor as
Qt,t+1 = β
(
vt+1
vt
)−γ
λt+1
λt
Pt
Pt+1
(
vt+1
Wt
)γ−χ
.
The most distinctive feature of the above stochastic discount factor is in the last
term, the ratio between the future value and the CES aggregate of the future value
across the state. In a standard expected utility specification, the last term drops
out since the inverse of the EIS and the risk aversion are assumed to be identical,
that is, γ = χ. The FOCs are summarized as
ν
ct
1− ht = wt (6)
Qt−1,t = β
(
ct
ct−1
)− γ+ν
1+ν
(
1− ht
1− ht−1
) ν(1−γ)
1+ν
pi−1t
(
vt
Wt−1
)γ−χ
(7)
Et
[
Qt,t+1Rt
]
= 1 (8)
Et
[
Qt,t+1pit+1
(
rKt+1 + (1− δ)
)]
= 1 (9)
where wt = Wt/Pt denotes the real wage, pit = Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross inflation,
and rKt = R
K
t /Pt denotes the real rental rate of capital. The first condition (6)
is usual labor supply equation and (8) and (9) are the asset pricing equations for
returns on the bond purchase and the physical investment, respectively. The only
different consequence from the standard expected utility maximizing household is
the definition of the stochastic factor (7).
2.2 Final Good Producing Firm
The perfectly competitive final good producing firm combines a continuum variety
of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] using the CES aggregation technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(j)
1− 1
η dj
) η
η−1
Here η > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution for each intermediate good.
The firm takes input prices Pt(j) and output prices Pt as given. Hence, the demand
for the intermediate good j is determined by
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−η
yt
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The relationship between intermediate goods prices and the price of the final good
can be written as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−η dj
) 1
1−η
(10)
2.3 Intermediate good producing firms
Intermediate good j is produced by a monopolist who has access to an identical
technology, represented by the production function
yt(j) = zt
(
kdt (j)
)α (
nt(j)
)1−α
− κ
where zt is an exogenous productivity process that is common to all firms, nt(j)
is the labor input of firm j, and kdt (j) is capital used by firm j. Labor and capital
are hired in perfectly competitive factor markets at Wt and R
K
t , respectively. The
parameter α denotes the cost share of capital and κ denotes the fixed cost of
production which ensures the zero profit at the steady state. Firms minimize the
total cost of production
Wtnt(j) +R
K
t k
d
t (j) + κ
of which the first-order condition implies
kdt (j)
nt(j)
=
α
1− α
Wt
RKt
Noting that firms face the same factor prices, the input capital-labor ratio should
be equal across all the intermediate good producing firms. The total cost function
for firm j can be written as
Ct(j) =
(
Wt
1− α
)1−α(
RKt
α
)α(
yt(j) + κ
zt
)
+ κ (11)
While each firm can set the price of its own output Pt(j), utilizing its monop-
olistic power, only a fraction (1− θ) of firms are given chances for full adjustment
at any given period, independent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment.
Thus, each period a measure (1− θ) of producers reset their output prices, while
a fraction θ keep their prices unchanged. As a result, the average duration of a
price is given by (1 − θ)−1. In this context, θ becomes a natural index of price
stickiness. To put it differently, each period t firm j’s output price is set as
Pt(j) =
{
Pt−1(j) with prob. θ
P ∗t (j) with prob. 1− θ
(12)
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where P ∗t (j) denotes the fully adjusted price reset at period t. In this model we
do not introduce the price indexation which is often assumed in the literature to
introduce the positive steady state inflation. Eventually with the higher order ap-
proximation, we can approximate the equilibrium around the nonstochastic steady
state where the inflation is strictly positive.
Now firm j who has a chance to reoptimize chooses the output price P ∗t (j) to
maximize the present value of future profits
max
P ∗t (j)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
(
P ∗t (j)y
∗
t+k(j)− C∗t+k(j)
)]
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
y∗t+k(j) =
(
P ∗t (j)
Pt+k
)−η
yt+k
for k = 0, 1, . . . and C∗t (j) denotes the total cost of production at period t when
the output is y∗t (j). The stochastic discount factor between t and t+k is obtained
by applying one period stochastic discount factor successively
Qt,t+k = Qt,t+1Qt+1,t+2 · · ·Qt+k−1,t+k
Hence, the first-order condition for price adjustment is given by
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+ky
∗
t+k(j)
{
P ∗t (j)−
η
η − 1MC
∗
t+k(j)
}]
= 0 (13)
where MC∗t (j) = ∂C
∗
t (j)
∂y∗t (j)
, the nominal marginal cost of production of firm j.
2.4 Government
The consolidated government prints money Mt, issues one period riskless nominal
bond Bt that pays the nominal gross return Rt, collects the lump-sum tax Tt
from households, and purchases the final good amount of gt that is subject to
an exogenous process. We further assume that the government runs a balanced
budget every period:
Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 + Ptgt = Mt +Bt + Tt
In a cashless economy, the government budget constraint can be written as
Rt−1
pit
bt−1 + (gt − τt) = bt (14)
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where bt = Bt/Pt denotes the real bond outstanding and τt = Tt/Pt denotes the
real lump-sup tax.
Monetary policy is described by an interest rate feedback rule of the form
log
(
Rt
R∗
)
= ρR log
(
Rt−1
R∗
)
+ (1− ρR)Et
[
φpi log
(pit−s
pi∗
)
+ φy log
(
yt−s
y∗
)]
(15)
for s = −1, 0, 1 where R∗ and pi∗ denote the target interest rate and inflation when
the monetary authority follows Ramsey policy and y∗ denotes the nonstochastic
Ramsey steady-state level of aggregate output. That is, the monetary authority
responds to the inflation gap and the output gap from the nonstochastic Ramsey
steady state level. The interest rate feedback rule (15) can be either contempora-
neous, forward-, or backward-looking.
2.5 Aggregation and Equilibrium
The price level of the economy is determined by (10) where intermediate good price
is set according to (12) and (13). Noting that each intermediate good producing
firm is ex ante identical, its pricing scheme is identical. That is, P ∗t = P
∗
t (j) when
firm j has a chance to reoptimize the output price. Hence, the pricing behavior
of each firm can be aggregated as
1 = (1− θ)(p∗t )1−η + θpiη−1t (16)
where p∗t = P
∗
t /Pt is the relative price of intermediate good to the final good and
pit = Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross inflation of the final good.
With aggregate demand for labor and capital, nt =
∫ 1
0
nt(j) dj and k
d
t =∫ 1
0
kdt (j) dj, firm’s cost minimization is aggregated as
kdt
nt
=
α
1− α
wt
rKt
From (11) the aggregate total cost of production is
Ct =
∫ 1
0
Ct(j) dj = κ
(
1 + Ωt
)
+ Ωtytst
where Ωt =
1
zt
(
Wt
1−α
)1−α (RKt
α
)α
and the price dispersion is defined as
st =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−η
dj
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Noting that the marginal cost of production for firm j is MCt(j) = Ωt, the real
marginal cost of aggregate production is
mct = = st
MCt(j)
Pt
With the aggregate capital-labor ratio, we write the marginal cost as the ratio of
the factor cost to its marginal product:
mct
st
αzt
(
kdt−1
nt
)α−1
= rKt (17)
mct
st
(1− α)zt
(
kdt−1
nt
)α
= wt (18)
Hence, the price adjustment decision (13) can be written more compactly as
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−1−η
yt+k
{
P ∗t
Pt+k
− η
η − 1
mct+k
st+k
}]
= 0 (19)
To facilitate the recursive representation, let
ξt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−η
yt+k
]
ζt = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−1−η
yt+k ·mct+k
st+k
]
Then we can write (19)
(p∗t )
η ξt = yt + θEt
[
Qt,t+1
(
pit+1p
∗
t+1
)η
ξt+1
]
(20)
(p∗t )
1+η ζt =
yt ·mct
st
+ θEt
[
Qt,t+1
(
pit+1p
∗
t+1
)1+η
ζt+1
]
(21)
and
ξt =
η
η − 1ζt (22)
The price dispersion can be shown to evolve as
st = (1− θ)(p∗t )−η + θpiηt st−1 (23)
In an equilibrium all the goods and factor markets should clear at each period.
For labor and capital markets we have
ht = nt (24)
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kt−1 = kdt (25)
Intermediate goods market should also clear for each firm’s product j. That is,
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−η
yt
and the aggregation gives us
zt
(
kdt
)α
n1−αt − κ = styt (26)
because the capital-labor ratio for each firm is identical. The final goods market
clearing condition is given by
yt = ct + it + gt (27)
Now we can define the competitive equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium
consists of a set of processes ct, ht, it, kt, Qt−1,t, kdt , nt, yt, mct, p
∗
t , wt, r
K
t , Rt,
pit, ξt, ζt, st, vt, ut, and Wt for t = 0, 1, . . . that satisfy equations (1)–(3), (5)–
(9), (14)–(18), and (20)–(27), given initial values for k−1 and s−1, and exogenous
stochastic processes gt and zt.
Moreover, the two exogenous processes, the common technological progress
shock that enters in the intermediate good production firms’ production functions
and the government spending shock, are specified as AR(1) processes.
log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + z,t
log(gt) = (1− ρg) log(g) + ρglog(gt−1) + g,t
A partial set of equilibrium conditions are listed in Appendix A.
2.6 Ramsey-Optimal Policy
In terms of setting the policy, the social planner may want to maximize the wel-
fare given the decision of the private sector without relying on a particular form
of policy rule such as (15). The welfare of the economy which is the planner’s
objective is given as the same form as the lifetime utility of the representative
agent, that is, a recursive form utility of Epstein-Zin type
v˜t = max
{
(1− β˜)
(
ct(1− nt)ν
) 1−γ
1+ν
+ β˜
(
Et
[
v˜1−χt+1
]) 1−γ1−χ} 11−γ
where β˜ denotes the planner’s subjective discount factor, v˜t denotes the social
welfare arises from the planner’s choice of policy. The constrained optimization
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is subject to the equilibrium characterization for endogenous variables, given in
Appendix A, (A1)–(A16). We can see that there 17 endogenous variables are in-
cluded in 16 constraints. Hence the planner’s optimization procedure would pin
down the variable with extra degree of freedom, namely the nominal interest rate
schedule. Since this is again a dynamic programming problem, we can utilize the
recursive structure of the planner’s objective. Let µit denote the Lagrange multi-
plier for the equilibrium condition (Ai). Then the first order conditions for the
Ramsey problem can be listed as (C1)–(C18) as well as the equilibrium behavior
of the private sector, (A1)–(A16), and this will characterize the equilibrium under
the Ramsey-optimal policy.
3 Solution Method
3.1 Perturbation and Recursive Form
The equilibrium characterization of the model is analyzed using the second-order
perturbation method. As shown in Caldara, Ferna´ndez-villaverde, Rubio-Ramı´rez,
and Yao (2009) the approximation error from the second-order approximation
is comparable to those from other global approximation methods such as the
projection with Chebyshev polynomial and the value function iteration. Hence, we
will stick to the second-order approximation in calculating equilibrium behavior
of our model. The details of the second order approximation can be found in
Judd (1988), Schmidtt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), Kim, Kim, Shaumburg, and Sims
(2005) among others.
The equilibrium condition of the model can generally be expressed as the fol-
lowing expectational equation vector
Et
[
f(xt, xt+1, yt, yt+1)
]
= 0 (28)
where xt denotes the predetermined state variable and yt is non-predetermined en-
dogenous variable. Once we write down the equilibrium conditions for a particular
model in this form, the policy function can be easily approximated by the pertur-
bation method. Dynare is a powerful computational tool that provides an easy
implementation of this numerical approximation on a standard desktop computer.
Actually most of the equilibrium conditions are fit into (28). Static conditions
such as (A3) and evolutionary equation such as (A1) are not even subject to the
expectation operator. Expectational equations such as (A4) also fits (28). The
problem arises when we need to deal with such forms as (19). Noting that the
10
infinite sums can be cast as a recursive representation, (19) can be included in
(28). In this respect, the Epstein-Zin preference specification should easily be
written as a part of (28). The only complication is related to the expression of the
continuation value. As we have seen before, the continuation value in the recursive
preference is the CES aggregator of the future welfare across the possible states of
the world. When it is written in a stochastic discount factor, as is often written
in a formidable form such as
Qt,t+1 = β
(
ct+1
ct
)−γ vt+1(
Et
[
v1−χt+1
] ) 1
1−χ
γ−χ
it is not so clear how the perturbation approach can deal with this expression.
One immediate and simple solution for this problem is to introduce an additional
variable as we did in Section 2. Let Wt denote the continuation value and define
as (3) then we can simply write
W1−γt = Et
[
v1−χt+1
]
and include it in (28). By introducing Wt, now we can code all the equilibrium
conditions in Dynare language.
3.2 Ramsey Steady State
As previously discussed, it is necessary to linearize the model around the zero in-
flation steady state when the model abstracts from the price indexation. However,
the approximation can be performed around any nonstochastic steady state if the
higher order perturbation is used. We assumed that the monetary authority in our
model exercises various versions of interest rate feedback rules and its target in-
terest rate and the inflation rate are set to the nonstochastic Ramsey steady state.
For an empirical investigation we need to calculate the Ramsey steady state first.
The Ramsey equilibrium solves the system of equations made up of the private
sector equilibrium condition (A1)–(A16) and the additional Ramsey first order
conditions (C1)–(C18). The nonstochastic steady state of the Ramsey equilib-
rium can be obtained by the following procedure. First, guess a steady state
interest rate and calculates the nonstochastic steady state of the private sector
equilibrium conditions. Given the steady state values, the remaining Ramsey first
order conditions are now a system of linear equations where all the unknowns are
the Lagrange multipliers µt’s. That is, the steady state values of the variables
given the interest rate solves the private sector equilibrium and hence the steady
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state values can be plugged into the additional Ramsey first order conditions. The
number of equations in this linear system is 17 while the number of unknown La-
grange multipliers are 16. Hence the least squares are used to evaluate the fit and
the guess on the interest rate will be updated to minimize the residual.
3.3 Calibration
For further analysis we calibrate the model at the nonstochastic steady state of
the competitive equilibrium. Table 1 reports the calibration of the structural
parameters. The model is calibrated to the postwar U.S. economy. The steady
state inflation is calibrated to 4.5 percent per annum and the government spending
is set to 17 percent of the output at the steady state which is the long run average
of the U.S. postwar observation. The capital share parameter α is 0.3 that implies
that the ratio of the labor cost in the production is 70 percent with the Cobb-
Douglas production function. The time discount factor is set to 0.99 that matches
the annual real interest rate around 4 percent. Noting that the annual depreciation
is around 10 percent so the depreciation rate is set at 0.25. The elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods is chosen as 5 so that the price markup
over the marginal cost is 25 percent at the steady state. The Calvo parameter
θ which governs the price stickiness is set at 0.8, which implies that the average
duration of price renewal is 5 quarters.
The disentanglement of the EIS 1/γ and the risk aversion χ is a distinctive
feature with the recursive preference. To facilitate the extra degree of freedom, we
set the risk aversion on a high side, 10. Since the model used in this paper does not
target to match the financial data anomalies such as the risk premium puzzle, it is
still the reasonable values. However, this high risk aversion by itself cannot match
the empirical anomalies in the financial data. Introducing the real adjustment
cost on the investment in line with Jermann (1998) helps a lot in explaining these
puzzles. One direct implication of high risk aversion in an equilibrium model is
that it breaks the comovement between the output and the consumption. With
the standard value for γ in the literature 2, our model demonstrates the correlation
to be too low, around 0.2. One possible solution to deal with this problem is to
adjust the EIS. With higher EIS the representative agent is more willing to move
the consumption across time horizon, that is, she becomes more sensitive to the
changes in income. We follow Bansal and Yaron (2004) that the EIS is even bigger
than the unity and set it to 1.25, equivalently γ = 0.8. With this adjustment, the
correlation between the output and the consumption is around 0.8. The parameter
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ν governs the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and hence
the labor supply is calibrated to 4.4543 so that the steady state hours of work is
around 20 percent of the endowment.
Finally, we set κ that governs the fixed cost of the production to 0.897 so that
firms entertains the zero profit in the steady state. For the two shock processes,
the technology shock and the government spending shock, we follow Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) for the calibration of the persistence of shocks and the
standard deviations of innovation terms, which is not quite different from the
values frequently used in the business cycles literature.
4 Empirical Results
Before we explain the empirical results, we should note the difficulty in calcu-
lating the welfare cost. The welfare level at the aquarium, either conditional or
unconditional, is easy to calculate. It is because the preference is already given in
a recursive formulation, and it is one of the variables that characterize the equi-
librium; hence, Dynare will automatically these values when we solve the model
economy on a computer. However, the welfare cost, as is often measured in the
loss of the consumption stream from the reference level of consumption, the Ram-
sey equilibrium in the context of our paper, is not as intuitive as in the expected
utility case. So we reports the level of the welfare directly rather than using a
relevant measure.
We first calculate the Ramsey steady state so that it can be referenced to the
monetary authority in choosing the monetary policy parameters. The nonstochas-
tic Ramsey steady state interest rate is 5.4 percent per annum and the inflation
is 1.25 percent annum. The welfare level at the Ramsey steady state is 0.636889.
Table 2 is a reproduction of Table 2 Panel A in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2007). Various monetary policy rule in a class of the interest rate feedback rule
is evaluated at the cashless economy with recursive preferences. To find optimal
parameter values, we search for the maximum attainable conditional welfare level
on a two-dimensional grid of ψpi and ψy for each type of policy, which includes
the one that responds only to contemporaneous output gap and inflation gap,
the backward looking one (i = 1), and the forward looking one (i = −1). The
optimized rules are also compared to non-optimizing rules such as the Taylor rule
(ψpi = 1.5 and ψy = 0.5) and the simple Taylor rule (ψpi = 1.5 and ψy = 0). The
independent search on a grid of ρR has reached the boundary of the grid in every
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optimized policy rule.
First, we note that the optimal response on the output gap is almost zero. For
all the optimizing policy rule scenario, not responding to the output gap increases
the welfare level. Result from the non-optimizing rules also confirms this finding:
The simple Taylor rule attains a higher welfare level than the standard Taylor
rule.
Secondly, the welfare level attained by contemporaneous smoothing rule is very
close to the welfare level at the Ramsey steady state. Also for all the optimized rule
the conditional welfare differ only at the fifth decimal level. However, we do not
have an appropriate welfare cost measure with recursive preferences, so it is hard
to tell if this tiny difference refers to relatively large in terms of the consumption
stream. As an alternative measure of the welfare level, we refer to the volatility
of the inflation and the interest rate. As shown in Woodford (2003), the welfare
level can be accurately approximated by linear combination of the variances of
the inflation, the output gap, and the interest rate up to second order, at least
in a simple new Keynesian model. The last two columns of Table 2 reports the
standard deviations of the inflation and the interest rate. Again the changes in the
standard deviation across the optimized simple rule are quite small. This finding
is well fit to the finding of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
Thirdly, the non-optimizing type monetary policy rules show significant differ-
ences in welfare levels. These big differences stem from restricting the inflation
gap responsiveness ψpi to 1.5, both in the standard and the simple Taylor rules.
Figure 1 depicts the impulse responses to a technology shock. The mone-
tary authority plays either the contemporaneous smoothing optimal policy (solid
line) or the standard Taylor rule (dashed line). Basically, the optimal simple rule
mimics the Ramsey equilibrium where nominal interest rate, price dispersion, and
marginal costs are instantly adjusted to the steady state level. With Taylor rule,
however, responses of the aforementioned variables show prolonged effects. With
the high EIS in recursive preferences, the consumption responds quite quickly to
the technology shock. Impacts on the capital are different in an order of magni-
tude. The initial responses to the hours worked even have different signs. Hence,
the welfare implications of the technology shock are very different when the mon-
etary authority adopts different policy rule. With the optimal simple rule, the
welfare shows much more prolonged responses.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides a simple way to analyze an economy where the representative
household’s utility is Epstein and Zin type. The welfare implication of the optimal
monetary policy is analyzed within this context.
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Table 1: Calibration of Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description
α 0.3 Capital share
β 0.99 Discount factor
γ 0.8 Inverse of EIS
δ 0.25 Depreciation rate
ν 4.543 Elasticity of substitution b/w consumption and labor
χ 10 Risk aversion
η 5 Price elasticity of demand for intermediate goods
θ 0.8 Price stickiness: Calvo parameter
κ 0.0897 Fixed cost of production
g¯ 0.616 Steady state level of government purchase
ρz 0.8556 Technology shock persistence
ρg 0.87 Government spending shock persistence
σz 0.0064 Standard deviation of technology shock
σg 0.016 Standard deviation of government purchasing shock
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Table 2: Optimal Monetary Policy
Rˆt = ρRRˆt−1 + (1− ρR) (ψpiEtpˆit−i + ψyEtyˆt−i)
ψpi ψy ψR vc vu σpi σR
Optimized Rules
Contemporaneous (i=0)
Smoothing 3 0.01 0.56 0.636887 0.636892 0.04 0.10
No Smoothing 3 0.01 0.636876 0.636885 0.04 0.11
Backward (i=1) 3 0.05 0.74 0.636878 0.636886 0.07 0.09
Forward (i=-1) 3 0.03 0.93 0.636839 0.636865 0.09 0.07
Non-Optimized Rules
Taylor Rule (i=0) 1.5 0.5 0.636068 0.636457 0.50 0.47
Simple Taylor Rule (i=0) 1.5 0.636816 0.30 0.30
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Function: Technology Shock
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A Equilibrium Characterization
Let us denote Qt−1,t by Qt. Given Rt, the equilibrium can be chracterized by the
following system of equations:
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + it (A1)
Qt = β
(
ct
ct−1
)− γ+ν
1+ν
(
1− nt
1− nt−1
) ν(1−γ)
1+ν
pi−1t
(
vt
Wt−1
)γ−χ
(A2)
ν
ct
1− nt = wt (A3)
Et
[
Qt+1pit+1
(
rKt+1 + 1− δ
)]
= 1 (A4)
Et
[
Qt+1Rt
]
= 1 (A5)
mct
st
(1− α)zt
(
kt−1
nt
)α
= wt (A6)
mct
st
αzt
(
kt−1
nt
)α−1
= rKt (A7)
1 = (1− θ)(p∗t )1−η + θpiη−1t (A8)
(p∗t )
1+η ζt =
yt ·mct
st
+ θEt
[
Qt+1
(
pit+1p
∗
t+1
)1+η
ζt+1
]
(A9)
(p∗t )
η ξt = yt + θEt
[
Qt+1
(
pit+1p
∗
t+1
)η
ξt+1
]
(A10)
ξt =
η
η − 1ζt (A11)
ztkt−1
αn1−αt − κ = styt (A12)
yt = ct + it + gt (A13)
st = (1− θ)(p∗t )−η + θpiηt st−1 (A14)
v1−γt = (1− β)
(
ct(1− nt)ν
) 1−γ
1+ν
+ βW1−γt (A15)
W1−χt = Et
[
v1−χt+1
]
(A16)
log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + z,t
log(gt) = (1− ρg) log(g¯) + ρg log(gt−1) + g,t
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B Steady state
The nonstochastic steady state given R is obatained as follows.
B.1 Steady State: Step 1
i
k
= δ
pi = βQ−1 = βR (4) from (*)
c
k
=
w
ν
(
1
k
− n
k
)
rK =
1
β
− 1 + δ (5)
Q =
1
R
(3)
w =
mc
s
(1− α)
(
k
n
)α
k
n
=
(mc
s
α
rK
) 1
1−α
p∗ =
[
1− θpiη−1
1− θ
] 1
1−η
(6)
ζ =
y ·mc
s (1− θβpiη) (p∗)1+η
ξ =
y
(1− θβpiη−1) (p∗)η
ξ =
η
η − 1ζ
y
k
=
1
s
[(
k
n
)α−1
− κ
k
]
y
k
=
c
k
+
i
k
+
g
k
s =
(1− θ)(p∗)−η
1− θpiη (7)
v =
(
c(1− n)ν
) 1
1+ν
W = v (∗)
z = 1 (1)
g = g¯ (2)
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B.2 Steady State: Step 2
i = δk (13)
c =
w
ν
(1− n) (12)
n =
(mc
s
α
rK
)− 1
1−α
k (11)
w =
mc
s
(1− α)
(
k
n
)α
(9)
ζ =
(
1− 1
η
)
ξ (18)
ξ =
y
(1− θβpiη−1) (p∗)η (17)
mc =
(
1− 1
η
)
1− θβpiη
1− θβpiη−1 p
∗ s (8)
y =
1
s
(
kαn1−α − κ) (16)
k =
κ
s
+
w
ν
+ g
1
s
(
k
n
)α−1
+
w
ν
(
k
n
)−1
− δ
(10)
v =
(
c(1− n)ν
) 1
1+ν
(14)
W = v (15)
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C First-order Conditions for the Ramsey Prob-
lem
kt : −µ1t + Et
[
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂kt
]
= 0 (C1)
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
= β˜
(
v˜t+1
v˜t
)−γ v˜t+1(
Et
[
v˜1−χt+1
]) 1
1−χ
γ−χ
∂v˜t
∂kt−1
= µ1t (1− δ)− µ6t
αwt
kt−1
− µ7t
(α− 1)rKt
kt−1
− µ12t αztkα−1t−1 n1−αt
it : µ
1
t + µ
13
t = 0 (C2)
ct : (1− β˜)v˜γt
(
ct(1− nt)ν
) 1−γ
1+ν
(1 + ν)ct
− µ2t
γ + ν
1 + ν
Qt
ct
− µ3t
ν
1− nt + µ
13
t
+µ15t (1− β)(1− γ)
(
ct(1− nt)ν
) 1−γ
1+ν
(1 + ν)ct
+ Et
[
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂ct
]
= 0 (C3)
∂v˜t
∂ct−1
= µ2t
γ + ν
1 + ν
Qt
ct−1
nt : −(1− β˜)v˜γt
ν
1 + ν
(
ct(1− nt)ν
) 1−γ
1+ν
1− nt − µ
2
t
ν(1− γ)
1 + ν
Qt
1− nt − µ
3
t
νct
(1− nt)2
+µ6t
αwt
nt
+ µ7t
(α− 1)rKt
nt
− µ12t (1− α)ztkαt−1n−αt
−µ15t (1− β)
ν(1− γ)
1 + ν
(
ct(1− nt)ν
) 1−γ
1+ν
1− nt + Et
[
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂nt
]
= 0(C4)
∂v˜t
∂nt−1
= µ2t
ν(1− γ)
1 + ν
Qt
1− nt−1
Qt+1 : −µ4tpit+1
(
rKt+1 + 1− δ
)− µ5tRt + µ9t θ (pit+1p∗t+1)1+η ζt+1
+µ10t θ
(
pit+1p
∗
t+1
)η
ξt+1 +
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂Qt+1
= 0 (C5)
∂v˜t
∂Qt
= −µ2t
wt : µ
3
t + µ
6
t = 0 (C6)
rKt+1 : −µ4tQt+1pit+1 +
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂rKt+1
= 0 (C7)
∂v˜t
∂rKt
= µ7t
pit+1 : −µ4tQt+1
(
rKt+1 + 1− δ
)
+ µ9t θ(1 + η)Qt+1
(
p∗t+1
)1+η
piηt+1ζt+1
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+µ10t θηQt+1
(
p∗t+1
)η
piη−1t+1 ξt+1 +
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂pit+1
= 0 (C8)
∂v˜t
∂pit
= −µ2t
Qt
pit
+ µ8t θ(η − 1)piη−2t + µ14t θηpiη−1t st−1
mct : −µ6t
wt
mct
− µ7t
rKt
mct
+ µ9t
yt
st
= 0 (C9)
p∗t+1 : µ
9
t θ(1 + η)Qt+1pi
1+η
t+1
(
p∗t+1
)η
ζt+1 + µ
10
t θηQt+1pi
η
t+1
(
p∗t+1
)η−1
ξt+1
+
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂p∗t+1
= 0 (C10)
∂v˜t
∂p∗t
= µ8t (1− θ)(1− η)(p∗t )−η − µ9t (1 + η) (p∗t )η ζt − µ10t η (p∗t )η−1 ξt
−µ14t (1− θ)η (p∗t )−η−1
ζt+1 : µ
9
t θQt+1
(
pit+1p
∗
t+1
)1+η
+
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂ζt+1
= 0 (C11)
∂v˜t
∂ξt
= −µ9t (p∗t )1+η + µ11t
η
η − 1
ξt+1 : µ
10
t θQt+1
(
pit+1p
∗
t+1
)η
+
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂ξt+1
= 0 (C12)
∂v˜t
∂ξt
= −µ10t (p∗t )η − µ11t
yt : µ
9
t
mct
st
+ µ10t + µ
12
t st − µ13t = 0 (C13)
st :
[
µ6t
wt
st
+ µ7t
rKt
st
− µ9t
yt ·mct
s2t
]
+ µ12t yt − µ14t + Et
[
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂st
]
= 0(C14)
∂v˜t
∂st−1
= µ14t θpi
η
t
Rt : −µ5tEt
[
Qt+1
]
+ Et
[
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂Rt
]
= 0 (C15)
∂v˜t
∂Rt−1
= −µ16t
bt−1
pit
vt+1 : µ
16
t (1− χ)v−χt+1 +
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂vt+1
= 0 (C16)
∂v˜t
∂vt
= µ2t (γ − χ)
Qt
vt
− µ15t (1− γ)v−γt
Wt : µ15t β(1− γ)W−γt − µ16t (1− χ)W−χt + Et
[
∂v˜t
∂v˜t+1
∂v˜t+1
∂Wt
]
= 0 (C17)
∂v˜t
∂Wt−1 = −µ
2
t (γ − χ)
Qt
Wt−1 (C18)
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